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CONTRACTUAL LIMITATION OF LIABILITY BY THE
SO-CALLED "MASSACHUSETTS TRUST," UNDER
THE INDIANA LAW
In the repent case of McLaren v. Dawes Sign & Mfg. Co., 156
N. E. 584, the Indiana Appellate Court has expressed the opinion
that contractual limitations of liability, are illegal in this state,
except in the case of corporations. The suit in question was
brought against the trustees of a "business trust," which was
organized on the model familiar in Massachusetts, and commonly known as a "Massachusetts trust." The court insisted that
such an organization must have been formed for the purpose
of evading the corporation laws of this state. Accordingly it was
held that the contractual limitation of liability of the defendants
(provided in the declaration of trust, which was recorded, and
also on the printed letter-heads and similar literature used by
the defendants)' was illegal and that the trustees were liable
as partners.
It is beyond the scope of this comment to treat exhaustively
the question of the difference between a business trust and a
partnership. The problem is really one of distinguishing between agents and trustees, for it is well known that these terms,
though widely different in their legal connotation, are often
used almost interchangably, or even with the deliberate purpose
of confusing the meaning in the particular document-so that
the users may be able to sustain whichever meaning may later
prove most for their convenience.2 The test is one of control.
The agent is under the control of his principals; the trustee,
while bound to account to his cestuis, is not required to obey
their instructions, nor to conduct the affairs of the trust in
accordance with the judgment of anyone except his own. In
the case of a business trust so-called, the problem as to how far
the persons beneficially interested may make their wishes effective in the general conduct of the business, and still have a real
trust, is obviously somewhat difficult. In Massachusetts itself
1 It is stated that "Appellee had no notice or knowledge of the existence
of the declaration of trust", and that the stationery did not have the warning of the existence of the trust printed on it, as had been intended. It
would seem that the plaintiff was not duly warned of the limitation of
liability of the defendants, so that on this ground the result of the case
may be supported.
2 See I Willi.ton on Contracts, Section 313, where it is said "It must
be remembered that what is nominally a trust may be in reality and in
legal effect an unincorporated association or partnership, the so-called
trustees being more properly designated as agents."
318
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the courts have tended to apply this test somewhat rigidly, and
wherever the holders of the beneficial interest have any power
to initiate action, the organization will generally be held to be
a partnership and the so-called trustees will be treated as mere
4
agents. 3 Other authorities have urged a somewhat broader test.
On principle, the question would seem to be whether the holders
of the beneficial interests are given such powers as will enable
them to effectively interfere in the business. If so, a partnership certainly exists; if, on the other hand, the management of
the ordinary business is solely in the hands of the trustees,
there is a real trust, even though the cestuis may have considerable powers in unusual circumstances5
However, the initial fallacy of the Indiana court goes deeper.
It is embodied in the theory, to which reference has already been
made, that the formation of a business trust is in contravention
of the corporation laws of this state, or at least inconsistent
with their purpose. But trusts are probably as ancient, and

certainly as respectable as private corporations.8

Furthermore,

3 The leading Massachusetts case is William v. Milton, 215 Mass. 1, 102
N. E. 353, wrere nearly all former decisions of the court are reviewed
and, so far as possible, reconciled. In the trust there in question, the
holders of beneficial interests had no power except to consent to the amendment or termination of the trust (these being matters which only the trustees courni.it.ate). '1he court held that this constituted a pure trust, but
laid considerable stress on the fact that the cestuis were permitted to act
only individuahy and not by meetings. A similar trust was before the
U. S. Supreme Court in Crocker v. Malley, 249 U. S. 223 and the decision
of the Massachusetts court was approved. See, however, Hecht v. Malley,
265 U. S. 144. 'he Massachusetts courts seem to adhere closely to the
rule of Williams v. Milton; see Nevile v. Gifford, 242 Mass. 124, 130 N. E.
160.
4 Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. L. C. 268; Wells-Stone Mercantile Co. v. Glover,
....
460, 75 N. W. 91; CreLkan v. Megargel, 234 N. Y. 67, 136 N. E. 296.
In Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Copeland, 39 R. I. 193, 98 Atl. 273,
the trust instrument under consideration provided that the certificateholders could remove trustees and elect others in their place; they could
also amend or terminate the trust at any time; and all action of the certificate-holders was to be taken at meetings. Yet the court, without much
discussion, held this organizat'on to constitute a pure trust. Smith v.
Anderson. 15 Ch. D. 247, supports a similar view. See also "The Position
of Shareholders in Business Trusts", by Calvert Magruder, in 23 Columbia
Law Review 423.
5 See "The Massachusetts Trust," by Ira P. Hildebrand, in 1 Texas
Law Rev. 127, for an able defense of the view that this matter should be
determined from a practical standpoint.
6 "We perceive no ground for grouping the two-beneficiaries and trustees-together, in order to turn them into an association .... It seems
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the carrying on of business by this device and without statutory
aid has no elements of novelty; certainly it has long been accomplished through testamentary trusts.7 The only novelty to which
the Massachusetts trusts may seriously lay claim is the provision for transferrable beneficial interests, but this is common
enough, not only in that rather strange kind of partnerships
known as joint-stock associations s but also in the case of corporate mortgages, where every transferee of bonds is also the
holder of an undivided beneficial interest in the security.
Granting then that we have a business trust, the question
remains whether it is possible to absolve the certificate-holders
(the certificates represent the beneficial interests) from liability. The answer is clearly in the affirmative. In the first place,
the certificate-holders are neither parties to, nor have they any
control over, the contracts made by the trustees. There is
accordingly no direct right against them. It is true that the
cestuis have the duty of indemnifying the trustees against liability in connection with any contracts properly entered into in
behalf of the trust and probably the creditors may take advantage of this right.9 But this is a derivative right and it seems
clear that it can be given up by an arrangement between the
trustees and the certificate-holders, even without consent of
the creditors (except, of course, with respect to existing liabilities.) A fortiori,where the creditor himself consents in advance
to give up any right against the cestuis, there seems to be no
room for any contention that the cestuis are bound.' 0
But let it be assumed that the attempt to form a trust has
proven a failure, because of the giving of too great powers to
the certificate-holders. These unfortunate persons, who have
had powers greater than they ever realized, desired, or used,
are now confronted with an equally greater and an even more
to be an unnatural perversion of a well-known institution of the law."
Holmes, J., in Crocker v. Malley, supra, at page 234.
7Ex

parte Garland, 10 Ves. Jr. 111.

8 See Carter v. McClure, 98 Tenn. 109, 88 S. W. 585.

9Hardoon v. Belilios (1901), A. C. 118. See also I Williston on Contracts, Section 313.
lOBetts v. Hackathorn, 159 Ark. 621, 252 S. W. 602; Crehan v. Megargel, supra. See also Smith v. Anlerson, supra; In re SiddaU, 29 Ch.
D. 1. The Texas decisions of Connally v. Lyons, 82 Texas 664, 18 S. W.
799 and Industrial Lumber Co. v. Texas Pine Land Ass'n., 31 Tex. Civ.
App. 375, 72 S. W. 875, to the same effect, are overruled by Thompson v.
Schmitt, 274 S. W. 554, which will be referred to hereafter. The legal
questions are carefully analyzed by Robert S. Stevens in "Limited Liability
in Business Trusts," 7 Cornell Law Quart. 116.
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unexpected liability-that of partners. Still, the creditor has
agreed not to procede against the certificate-holders (or has
contracted with the association with notice of the inability, or
at least impropriety, of the so-called trustees binding the certificate-holders personally, which would seem to amount to the
same thing) and there seems to be no reason why he should be
given this additional advantage against the certificate-holders,
even if they are partners. The only answer that can be given
to this is "public policy," and it is submitted that this is no
answer at all. Why a number of individuals carrying on business together-or a single individual, for that matter-should
not be able, with the consent of the creditor, to limit his or their
liability to the amount invested in the business, is something
which business men, at least, cannot see, and it is believed that
the law itself has not been successful in devising any justification
for a negative answer to this inquiry." It is often urged that
this results in no one being liable. Assuming that this would be
a fatal objection,12 the obvious answer is that it is not true in
fact-all the individuals are liable, but in an amount limited
by their contribution to the business. A more serious objection
is the possible unfairness to the creditor. But he has agreed to
this, and if he was unwilling to consent, he should not have
entered into the transaction. This objection has a certainly validity in that it emphasizes the importance of full notice to the
creditor, in order that his consent to the arrangement shall be
actual and well-considered. Undoubtedly the burden should be
on the certificate-holders to show that the creditor has actually
consented to give up any recourse against them;13 but when
this has been shown, there is no reason in theory or justice why
the creditor should be permitted to disregard his own agreement
not to proceed against them. The few authorities against this
view should not be followed. 14
11 To the effect that the liability may be so limited, see Hibbs v. Brown,
190 N. Y. 167, 82 N. E. 1108; McCarthy v. Parker,243 Mass. 464, 138 N.
E. 8; Ex Parte Garland, supra, and Halket v. Merchant's etc. Ass'n., 13

Q. B. 960. In the case last mentioned, policies issued by the defendant provided that the shareholders were not to be liable and that the only recourse
of the policy-holders was against the "capital stock and funds." This provision was upheld.
12 But see to the effect that it is not, Shoe & Leather National Bank

v. Dix, 123 Mass. 148, 151.
13 Hayes Motor etc. Co. v. Wolff, 175 Wis. 501, 185 N. W. 512; Neville
v.Gifford, supra; Rand v. Morse, 289 Fed. 839.

14 The clearest contrary authority is Thompson v. Schmitt, 274 S. W.
554, where the Texas Supreme Court reached the astounding conclusion

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

But the Indiana court might admit all this and still insist
that the principle case was rightly decided. The court would
undoubtedly point out that all the defendants in this case were
trustees and that the above reasoning has no bearing on their
liability. It must be admitted that the problem of devising a
scheme for relieving the trustees from liability, is somewhat
more troublesome. In a real trust, the right of the creditor
against the trustees is direct, and not merely derivative as in
the case of the cestuis. Accordingly, there is no possibility of
claiming that the trustees should be exempt, unless by reason
of an express agreement to that effect. The matter of notice
to the creditor-is vital here, and it would not seem that a provision in the trust agreement limiting the liability of the trustees would be sufficient, unless actually brought to the attention
of the creditor.1 5 But there is no more objection to the limitation of the liability of trustees that to a similar limitation in the
case of partners.' 8 If it be urged that the usual result is to take
away the personal liability of both trustees and cestuis, the
answer is not only that the creditor has agreed to this, but that
he has in fact recourse to the trust fund, which will ordinarily
be sufficient.
that a business trust is a partnership because the trustees are the agents
of the so-called cestuis, although the cestuis have no control whatever over
the trustees, and also that both cestuis and trustees are personally liable
upon all contracts even though it is specifically provided in the contract
that they shall not be. This mere statement of the holding of the court
is believed to be sufficient to demonstrate that it cannot be characterized
as other than "grotesque." Indeed the decision-or at least the last part
of it-is vigorously and effectively criticized by Professor Hildebrand in 4
Texas Law Rev. 57. The Texas Commission of Appeals has in effect declined to follow the authority of the Thompson case in Shelton v. Montaya
Oil and Gas Co., 292 S. W. 165, holding that the trustees and cestuis in a
business trust may limit their liability by contract.
Such cases as People v. Hinkle, 126 Wash. 581, 219 Pac. 41, holding
that a "common-law trust" is an illegal organization would probably lead to
the same result, so far as personal liability of cestuis is concerned.
15Neville v. Gifford, supra;,Mitchell v. Whitlock, 121 N. C. 166, 28 S.
E. 292.
16 Taylor v. Davis, 110 U. S. 830; Rand v. Morse, supra; Bank of Topeka v. Eaton, 100 Fed. 8,affd. 107 Fed. 1003; Ad'ams v. Swig, 234 Mass.
584, 125 N. E. 857; Shoe and Leather National Bank v. Dix, supra; Rand
v. Farquhar,226 Mass. 91, 115 N. E. 286. The case of Betts v. Hackathorn,
supra, reaches the opposite result on the assumed authority of Taylor V.
Davis, supra, but the court was misled by its failure to quote the entire
governing portion of the opinion in the Taylor case. Of course the mere
signature by the trustees as such will not limit their liability. Roger
Williams National Bank v. Groton Manufacturing Co., 16 R. I. 504, 17
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If the so-called trustees claim exemption where the assumed
trust has been declared a partnership, they are actually agents
claiming exemption from personal liability on contracts made in
behalf of their principals, the certificate-holders. Such a claim
is reasonable and quite usual; indeed there would be good
grounds for contending that the agents should not be bound
even in the absence of an express agreement to that effect.27
However, since the certificate-holders, the principals, are themselves generally not bound, the presumption would arise that
the agents (the so-called trustees) would be bound.1 8 This presumption could only be rebutted by showing an express agreement, as before, but there would appear to be even less chance
for maintaining that such an agreement contravened public
policy.
The foregoing discussion relates, of course, so!ely to contractual liability. The possibility of limiting tort liability is
much more restricted. It would seem impossible to limit the
liability of the trustees, whether or not the organization is held
to constitute a pure trust, since such limitation of liability can
only be secured by contract. There are some authorities to the
effect that the cestuis of a pure trust are not liable for torts
of the trustees, on the ground that the trustees are not the agents
of the cestuis and that they have no right of indemnity of which
the creditors may take advantage. 19 There seems to be no logical answer to this position, but it is suggested that this may
inflict a distinct hardship upon the victim of the misdoings of
the trustees, and that here there is a legitimate ground for the
courts to interfere on grounds of public policy.2o
It is believed that the reasoning of the court in the McLaren
case is erroneous both in denying the possibility of the formation of a business trust in this state2 ' and also in the assumption
Atl. 170. In Hess v. Werts, 4 Searg. & R. (Pa.) 355 and in Greenwood's
Case, 3 DeG. M. & G. 459, there are well-considered dicta that even individuals may limit their personal liability by contract.
17 Hurricane Milling Co. v. Steel & Payne Co., 84 W. Va. 376, 99 S. E.
490.
18 Kelner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. P. 174.
19 Falardeauv. Boston Art Students Ass'n., 182 Mass. 405, 65 N. E. 797;
Curry v. Dorr, 210 Mass. 430, 97 N. E. 87. In Fisheries Co. v. McCoy,
202 S. W. 343 (Texas Civil Appeals) it is held that a contract between
the trustees and an employee limiting the liability of the former for
injuries to the employee is void as contrary to public policy.
20 But see Wright v. Caney River Ry. Co., 151 N. C. 529, 66 N. E. 588.
21 The Supreme Court in Ridge v. State, 192 Ind. 639, 137 N. E. 759,
seems to approve the formation of a business trust in this state.
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that the liability of cestuis or even partners cannot be limited
by agreement. As already pointed out, the actual decision may
have been correct, but the reasons given by the court are erroneous and should not be followed. The court itself weakens its
position with respect to business trusts, since, after the condenonation of such organizations which has already been summarized, it adds:
"Such associations, even in this state, may be trust organizations or
they may be partnerships, depending entirely on the provisions of the instrument under which they are organized."

This seems to be an admission by the court that business
trusts may be organized in Indiana, notwithstanding all alleged
reasons of public policy to the contrary. It is submitted that
the court should-and it is believed that it will in a proper case
-likewise change its opinion that cestuis and trustees--and also
partners and their agents-cannot limit their personal liability
by contract. Both views rest upon theories of public policy
which are not in fact sustainable.
ROBERT C. BROWN.
Indiana University School of Law.

